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Title VII-Timely Filing Requirement in Deferral States
Is Satisfied When the Initial Complaint Is Received by
the EEOC Within the 300-day Limitation of § 706(e)
Silver v. Mohasco Corp. *
I. Introduction
The Second Circuit's decision in Silver v. Mohasco Corp. I involved the inter-
pretation of the filing requirements for an employment discrimination suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The Silver court held that a
discrimination claim may be "filed" with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) during the statutorily required state deferral period.
Title VII seeks to eliminate employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 3 In order to effectuate this goal,
the EEOC was established to supervise the complicated administrative and
judicial enforcement scheme designed by Congress.
4
The procedural requirements as stated in Title VII leave many questions
unanswered. This comment will explore the specific statutory provisions in-
volving interaction between the federal and state employment discrimination
agencies, and the effect of this relationship on the time limitations for filing a
Title VII claim.
A proper analysis of the Title VII filing requirements also requires ex-
ploration of the complex legislative history of the Act as well as investigation of
relevant judicial decisions. Such an exploration is, therefore, included in this
comment in order that the time limitations on filing may be more fully
understood.
5
II. Statement of the Facts
Ralph H. Silver, a man of the Jewish faith, was hired by the Mohasco
Corporation on July 15, 1974. Silver alleged that throughout his relationship
with Mohasco he was harassed and abused by the corporate officials in an ef-
fort to force his resignation. Silver believed that he was a victim of a plan by the
corporation by which minorities were hired, harassed, and fired in a systematic
manner in order to create a facade of equal employment opportunity in com-
pliance with the mandates of Title VII.
* 602 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1979) (No. 79-616).
1 Id.
2 42 U.S.C. 5§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII].
3 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 703(a)).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706).
5 A secondary issue raised by Silver involved the power of the court to consider allegations of
blacklisting and false references by an employer subsequent to an employee's discharge. This issue is not
within the scope of this comment.
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Silver was discharged by Mohasco on August 29, 1975, thirteen months
after being hired. No action was taken by Silver until June 15, 1976, 291 days
after his discharge. On this date he wrote to the Buffalo office of the EEOC
alleging that he had been both hired and fired because of his religious beliefs.
At this point, the complex procedural scheme of Title VII was set in motion.
Upon receipt of Silver's letter, the EEOC forwarded it to the New York State
Division of Human Rights (NYSDHR), the state counterpart to the EEOC. 6
This deferral by the EEOC to the state agency was in compliance with the pro-
cedures of Title VII, which give the state agency 60 days to act on the charge
before the EEOC may begin processing the claim. The EEOC advised the
NYSDHR that it would automatically file the charges at the end of the 60-day
deferral period. 7 The EEOC formally processed Silver's charge on August 20,
1976.
On February 9, 1977 the NYSDHR issued a report stating that it had
found no probable cause to believe that Silver had been discharged due to his
religion. The EEOC without further investigation -adopted the findings of the
state agency as its own on August 24, 1977. At this juncture, the statutorily re-
qttired "right to sue" letter was issued by the EEOC to Silver, allowing him to
pursue his remedy in federal district court. 8
Silver filed formal charges in the Northern District of New York on
November 23, 1977. The suit was dismissed by the district court on the. ground
that Silver's original filing with the EEOC had not been timely. The Second
Circuit, viewing the time limitations of Title VII in a more liberal manner,
reversed the decision and deemed the charges timely filed.
III. Title VII Procedure in Brief
The vehicle of enforcement for Title VII violations is the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. 9 The procedures to be followed by the agency
are delineated in the Act and in periodic publications of rules and regulations
formulated by the Commission itself.10
The initial step of the procedure is the receipt of the aggrieved party's
complaint by either the EEOC or the appropriate state agency. If a state or
local agency is qualified to deal with the complaint, the law requires that the
EEOC defer to the state or local agency for a period of 60 days, unless the state
6 At the present time 43 states have such agencies. [1979] 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) S 1601.74.
7 The following note from the EEOC to the NYSDHR was attached to the letter:
This charge is being deferred to your agency pursuant to S 706(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended. The Commission will automaticallyfile this charge at the end of the period, unless
we are notified before the expiration of that period that your agency has terminated its pro-
ceedings.
Brief for Appellee at 4, Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting letter from EEOC
to NYSDHR, June 15, 1976) (emphasis added).
Had the NYSDHR terminated proceedings within nine days, there is no doubt that Silver's charge
would have been deemed timely filed. The language of S 706(e), allowing EEOC action upon termination of
state proceedings, permits such claims to receive immediate attention. See text accompanying note 22 infta.
8 See text accompanying notes 17-19 infa.
9 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-4 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 705).
10 Id.
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proceedings terminate earlier. 1 If a state does not have an agency to deal with
employment discrimination, the procedure is simplified in that the only time
limitation applicable is one calling for filing with the EEOC within 180 days.
1 2
Upon expiration of the statutory deferral period, or immediately if the
state has no agency to deal with the complaint, the EEOC may embark upon
its own investigation of the claim.
13
At the termination of this investigation, the EEOC will issue a determina-
tion as to the validity of the claim.1 4 Should the Commission find reasonable
cause to believe a violation has occurred, it will make efforts to remedy the
situation through conference, conciliation, or persuasion.15 If conciliatory ef-
forts by the Commission prove unsuccessful, the EEOC may bring suit on
behalf of the individual in federal district court.
16
Regardless of whether the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that a
violation has been committed, the private party may initiate a suit in federal
district court to seek a remedy on his own behalf.' 7 Access to the federal
judiciary is triggered by the EEOC's automatic issuance of a "right to sue" let-
ter to the individual, which authorizes the party to bring suit within 90 days of
receipt of the letter.' 8 The "right to sue" letter will be issued by the EEOC: (1)
after a finding of no reasonable cause to believe a violation has occurred, or (2)
after a finding of cause, failure of conciliation, and a determination that the
case will not be litigated by the EEOC on behalf of the complainant.' 9
This unique combination of administrative and judicial action in dealing
with employment discrimination claims has caused a good deal of procedural
confusion. An example of this confusion is found in the vague filing re-
quirements of Title VII. Indeed, it was this very confusion which led the
district court and the circuit court to come to different conclusions in Silver.
IV. Conflicting Definitions of "Filed"
The definition of a seemingly simple word-"filed"-is critical to the
determination of the timeliness of a Title VII complaint. The dilemma in inter-
preting the word "filed" is due to the fact that the word is used in two portions
of section 706 of Title VII without sufficient elaboration of its meaning.
20
11 If the state agency has been in existence for less than one year, the deferral period is 120 days. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(c)).
12 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(e)).
13 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(b)).
15 Id. Title VII indicates a strong preference for voluntary settlement.
16 The power to bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved party was granted to the EEOC in the 1972
amendments to the Act. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f) (1976) (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 5 706(0(1)).
18 Id. A private party may also come before the courts without this "right to sue" letter via intervention
in an action pursued on his behalf by the EEOC. Id.
19 Id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706).
398 [February 1980]
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Section 706(c) in pertinent part provides:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State'
... which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment prac-
tice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice ... no charge may befiled ... [with the EEOC]
by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier
terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hun-
dred twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or
local law .... 21
The meaning of this section is not entirely clear when read in conjunction
with a related portion of the statute, section 706(e). This section provides that:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... except that in a
case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person ag-"
grieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice . . . , such charge shall be
filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after
receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings
under the State or Local law, whichever is earlier .... 22
There were two possible interpretations of section 706 available to the
Second Circuit in Silver's case. First, the statute can be read literally with
"filed" meaning the same thing in both sections 706 (c) and (e). Under this
view Silver's claim could not have been "filed" with the EEOC until 60 days
after the EEOC had deferred the claim to the state agency. Since Silver did not
report his claim to the EEOC until 291 days after the alleged discriminatory fir-
ing occurred, waiting the 60 days as required by section 706(c) would mean
that Silver's claim was not "filed" with the EEOC until 352 days after the act
occurred. Such a literal interpretation would cause Silver's claim to be
classified as untimely under section 706(e), which requires filing with the
EEOC within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act in those states in
which deferral is required.
This literal interpretation requires that the aggrieved party's claim reach
the state agency, either directly from the party or via the EEOC deferral
policy,23 within 240 days after the discriminatory act.
24
The second possible route open to the Second Circuit, and that which was
adopted in Silver, is interpretation of the word "filed" in section 706(c) as dif-
ferent from the word "filed" in section 706(e). This equates the word "filed"
in section 706(e) to mean "received." The interpretation still requires the
21 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(c) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(c)) (emphasis added).
22 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(e) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(e)) (emphasis added).
23 See text accompanying notes 45-50 infra.
24 This figure is arrived at by subtracting the 60-day mandatory deferral period of 5 706(c) from the
maximum 300-day time limitation for filing with the EEOC in § 706(e).
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federal agency to refrain from processing the charge until the 60-day state
deferral period has elapsed, and is consistent with the intent of section 706(c) to
allow appropriate state agencies the initial opportunity to resolve disputes.
This interpretation, however, would allow filing with the EEOC to occur
within the state deferral period. Under this liberal view, Silver's claim would
be considered filed for purposes of section 706(e) on the 291st day after the
discriminatory act occurred, before expiration of the 60-day deferral period,
and in apparent contravention of section 706(c).
V. Legislative History of the Title VII Filing Procedure
Examination of the legislative history of Title VII reveals a conflict as to
the meaning and purpose of the time limitations for filing a claim when the
claim is initially deferred to a state agency. The central issue in this conflict is
the nature of the interpretation to be given to the word "filed."
A. The Case for Literal Interpretation
If the word "filed" is read literally, that is, filing with the EEOC is not
permitted within the 60-day deferral to the state agency, then Mr. Silver's
complaint must be classified as untimely. 25 Silver took his initial action on the
291st day, therefore, if he were required to wait the 60 days before filing with
the EEOC, the earliest possible date for federal filing would be 352 days after
the discriminatory act. Viewed from this literal perspective, the aggrieved par-
ty must take initial action, either directly or via the EEOC deferral policy,
within 240 days after the alleged discriminatory act. The figure 240, however,
is found nowhere in the statute.
B. A More Restrictive Approach
The legislative history of section 706 reveals that its provisions were
altered as the major ingredient of the Mansfield-Dirksen compromise. This
compromise was a major factor in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26
The primary provisions of the compromise called for short limitation periods
and deferral to appropriate state agencies. The compromise provided for state
action to settle employment discrimination problems whenever possible. This
cession of power was an effort to respect individual state agencies that were
already in existence, and those that might come into existence.
27
Due to the requirement of state action on claims, the compromise extend-
ed the filing limitation 120 days beyond that allotted in nondeferral states. In
arguing on the Senate floor on behalf of the compromise, Senator Everett
25 But see text accompanying notes 66-76 infra, discussing the tolling concept as applied to the filing
limitations.
The following cases have recognized a second exception to the filing limitations in the case of a continu-
ing violation: Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 551 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1977); Macklin v.
Spector Freight Sys. Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.
1969).
26 Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rzv. 431 (1966).
27 See note 11 supra.
[February 1980]400
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Dirksen was quite specific as to the intended usage of the additional 120 days.
He stated:
New subsection (d) [now labelled (e)] requires that a charge be filed with the
Commission within 90 days [now 180 days] after the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice occurred, except that- if the person aggrieved follows State or
local procedures in subsection (b) [now (c)], he may file the charge within 210
days [now 300 days] after the alleged [unlawful employment] practice oc-
curred or within 30 days after receiving notice that the State or local pro-
ceedings have been terminated, whichever is earlier. The additional 120 days is
to allow him to pursue his remedy by State or local proceedings.
28
The language of Senator Dirksen indicates that the extended filing period was
not intended to be a bonus for those who live in deferral states,29 but as an
equitable provision for those who are required to pursue state remedies. The
obvious fear of the Congress was that the time limitations on the federal right
would expire while the party was involved in required state proceedings.
During the 1972 session-of Congress, significant changes were made in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 via the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.30
The 1972 amendment affecting section 706(e) extended the period for filing
with the EEOC from 90 to 180 days in nondeferral states, and from 210 to the
present 300 days in deferral states. The remainder of the statute was not
changed.
A conference report submitted by Representative John Dent, and ac-
cepted by the House, in conjunction with the 1972 amendments, offers support
for an even more restrictive interpretation than the 240-day initial action inter-
pretation of the literal approach. The report of Representative Dent construed
the statute to require the complainant to take initial action with the EEOC or
the appropriate state agency within 180 days after the occurrence of the
discriminatory act. 3 1 Two sections of the report described the procedure to be
followed in both deferral and nondeferral states. The first sentence of each sec-
tion indicated that the time limitation for initial action in both instances should
be 180 days.
32
A possible rationale for Dent's approach is that a new state agency is re-
quired to be allowed 120 days to process a charge without EEOC action. 33 This
28 602 F.2d at 1093 (quoting EEOC's Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 at 3018) (emphasis added).
29 See Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1233 (8th Cir. 1975).
30 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 5 2000).
31 PROCEDURE WHERE NO STATE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW
EXISTS
(1) A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of an alleged unlawful
employment practice. ...
PROCEDURE WHERE STATE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW EX-
ISTS
(1) A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of an alleged unlawful
employment practice.
If a charge is initially filed with a state or local agency, such charge must be filed with the
Commission within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice has occurred or within 30 days
after receipt of notice that the state or local agency has terminated proceedings.
118 CONG. REC. 7569 (1972) (report of Representative Dent).
32 Id.
33 A "new state agency" refers to one which has been in existence for less than one year. 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(c) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, § 706(c)).
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deferral period plus the 180 days allowed in nondeferral states yields the max-
imum 300-day period for EEOC filing. Similarly, Representative Dent's ap-
proach would require filing with the EEOC within 240 days if the state agency
was already existing, and thus allowed only a 60-day deferral period. This
60-day deferral period plus the 180 days allowed in nondeferral states yields a
maximum 240-day period for EEOC filing. In light of the overall remedial pur-
poses of Title VII, this second position, concerning states with preexisting state
agencies, appears untenable and unjust. Indeed, it is misleading to require a
complainant to make several computations, as suggested by the above ap-
proach, before arriving at the applicable filing limitation when the necessity to
do this is not apparent on the face of the statute.
The legislative history indicates that the EEOC filing system was designed
to allow individual state agencies time to act upon claims. It also appears to re-
quire that the 60-day deferral period be completed within the 300-day limita-
tion indicated in section 706(e). Reading the statute literally, therefore, the in-
itial filing with the state agency, either directly or through the EEOC deferral
policy, must occur within 240 days after the discriminatory act. Under the
more restrictive approach, initial action is required within 180 days after the
discriminatory act. Thus, "filing" for purposes of section 706(e) cannot occur
before or during the deferral period of section 706(c) under either the literal or
more restrictive approach.
C. The Case for Liberal Interpretation
Although the final draft of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, altered only the filing limitations
of section 706(e), the legislative reports surrounding the Act are critical to an
analysis of the filing requirements of Title VII.
The most persuasive evidence of Congressional intent to allow a com-
plainant the full 300 days provided in section 706(e) to make his initial com-
plaint may be found in the legislative reports. These reports explain why there
was no need to change the existing statutory language of section 706(e) during
the 1972 reevaluation of Title VII.
Congress would allow a complainant to "file" a claim with the EEOC
within the 60-day deferral period, contrary to the language of section 706(c).
Under this view, Silver's reporting of his claim to the EEOC on the 291st day
would have satisfied the requirement of section 706(e) that a charge be filed
with the EEOC within 300 days after the discriminatory act. A bill passed by
the Senate in 1972 is illustrative of this Congressional viewpoint. This bill
would have changed the language of section 706(c) from "no charge may be filed"
to "the Commission shall take no action. ,,34 It was defeated in the House, however,
34 The proposed bill would have revised § 706(c) to read:
(c) In the case of a charge filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved alleging an
unlawful employment practice occurring in a state or political subdivision of a State which has a
State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or
authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute
criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof the Commission shall take no
action with respect to the investigation of such charge before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, except
[February 1980]
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because the change was deemed unnecessary in light of the existing judicial
practice to interpret the language of section 706(c) in a manner consistent with
the suggested change. 35 The language of the proposed bill and the reasons for
its defeat in the House indicate a Congressional intent to favor a liberal inter-
pretation of the word "filed." Thus, a charge would be considered "filed"
with the EEOC upon receipt, prior to the 60-day deferral to the state agency.
Strong support for a liberal interpretation of section 706 is found in the
section-by-section analysis of the House-Senate Conference Committee report
accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. It states:
Section 706 (c) and (d) . . . . No change in these provisions was deemed
necessary in view of the recent Supreme Court decision of Love v. Pullman Co.,
__ U.S. -, 92 S. Ct. 616 (1972) which approved the present EEOC
deferral procedures as fully in compliance with the intent of the Act....
Similarly, the recent circuit court decision in Vigil v. A T&T, __ F.2d - ,
4 FEP cases 345 (10th Cir. 1972), which provided that in order to protect the aggrieved
person's right to file with the EEOC within the time periods specified in section 706 (c)
and (d) [now section 706(e)], a chargefiled with a State or local agency may also be filed
with the EEOC during the 60-day deferral period, is within the intent of this Act. 36
This report indicates that an interpretation allowing "filed" in section
706(e) to vary in meaning from "filed" in section 706(c) is not beyond the
legislative intent. It is apparent that the drafters of the report believed that this
interpretation had already been adopted by the federal courts. The clear im-
port of the section-by-section analysis is that the full 300 days allowed in section
706(e) are available to a complainant for the purpose of making his initial filing
with the EEOC. Thus, the charge may be filed with the EEOC within the
60-day state deferral period, notwithstanding the language of section 706(c).
Later, in the same document, the Committee further endorses those
judicial decisions that have taken a liberal view of Title VII filing re-
quirements. The report states:
Court decisions under the present law have shown an inclination to interpret
this time limitation so as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of
the law; it is not intended that such court decisions should be in any way cir-
cumscribed by the extension of the time limitations in this subsection. Existing
case law which has determined that certain types of violations are continuing
in nature, thereby measuring the running of the required time period from the
last occurrence of the discrimination and not from the first occurrence is con-
tinued, and other interpretations of the courts maximizing the coverage of the law are not
affected [by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act]. 7
that such sixty day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year
after the effective date of such State or local law ....
S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNO. REc. 290 (1972) (emphasis added).
See also S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1971):
The present statute is somewhat ambiguous respecting Commission action on charges filed prior
to resort to the State or local agency. The new language clarifies the present statute by permitting
the charge to be filed but prohibiting the Commission from taking action with respect thereto un-
til the prescribed period has elapsed.
35 See text accompanying note 36 infra.
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The legislative history of Title VII seems to conflict, in that support for
both the strict and the liberal interpretation does exist. In the final analysis,
however, the strong language of the House-Senate Conference Committee is
persuasive in its endorsement of the liberal interpretation of the filing re-
quirements applicable to Title VII.
VI. Effect of EEOC Regulations
The EEOC is authorized to issue regulations interpreting the procedural
scheme of Title VII. 38 The regulations in effect during the litigation of the Silver
case contained a specific provision interpreting the filing requirements in situa-
tions where deferral to state agencies was required. 39 Under this EEOC regula-
tion, Silver's claim would be "automatically filed" on the 300th day.
The district court found this regulation to be unauthorized by statute due
to the conflict between section 706 and the then-effective regulation. As writ-
ten, the regulation would have allowed active investigation by the EEOC on
the 300th day, significantly diminishing the amount of time available for the
exclusive state or local action. Thus, the court correctly concluded that the
regulation frustrated the strong federal policy behind the deferral system.
40
More recent regulations issued by the EEOC indicate a predisposition
toward a more liberal interpretation. 41 Through this interpretation it attempts
to preserve the federal remedy when a charge is initially filed with the EEOC
after 240 days have elapsed since the discriminatory act, yet before the 300-day
limit has expired.
Although the intent of the EEOC is clear, the effect of the agency's inter-
pretation is minimal if it is not recognized by the judiciary. While some cases
have held that the federal agency's interpretation is to be given great
deference, 42 it is also apparent that the judiciary may seek to determine
38 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-12(a) (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 5 713).
39 The regulation states:
In cases where the document is submitted to the Commission more than 180 days from the date of
the alleged violation but within the period of limitation of the particular 706 Agency [a state agen-
cy approved by the EEOC], the case shall be deferred pursuant to the procedures set forth above:
Provided, however, That unless the Commission is earlier notified of the termination of the State or
local proceedings, the Commission will consider the charge to be filed with the Commission on
the 300th day following the alleged discrimination and will commence processing the case. Where
the State or local agency terminates its proceedings prior to the 300th day following the alleged
act of discrimination, without notification to the Commission of such termination, the Commis-
sion will consider the charge to be filed with the Commission on the date the person making the
charge was notified of the termination.
29 C.F.R. S 1601.12(b)(1)(v)(A) (1977).
40 Although not applicable to Silver, it is noteworthy that the subsequent edition of the EEOC regula-
tions deleted the "automatic filing on the 300th day" provision, and substituted the present regulation
specifying that the § 706(e) filing requirements are satisfied on the day that the Commission initially receives
the charge-the precise holding in Silver.
The present regulation states: "The timeliness of a charge shall be measured for purposes of satisfying
the filing requirements ofsection 706(e) of Title VII by the date on which the charge is received by the Com-
mission." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (1978).
41 Id.








Recognizing that Title VII is a remedial statute designed to benefit the
workingman, the judiciary has consistently resolved procedural questions with
a bias toward liberality. 44 The decision in Silver is a logical extension of this
liberal interpretation.
A. The Love Decision
The primary source of judicial guidance in the interpretation of Title VII
filing requirements is the Supreme Court decision in Love v. Pullman Co.
45
In Love, the complainant lodged a complaint with the EEOC alleging con-
duct by an employer in violation of Title VII. The EEOC filed the charge oral-
ly with the state agency. Subsequently, the state agency waived the opportuni-
ty to explore the complainant's charge, and informed the EEOC. The EEOC
treated the charge as filed on the day the state agency waived its right to process
it. Without further action by the complainant, the EEOC began its own in-
vestigation. The investigation found probable cause to believe the charge to be
true, but attempts by the EEOC at voluntary conciliation proved unsuccessful.
The complainant then brought suit on his own behalf in accordance with Title
VII procedure.
The Tenth Circuit, 46 however, required a second filing by the complainant
with the EEOC, after the state agency's dismissal of the charge. Love's failure
to file with the EEOC a second time caused the circuit court to dismiss his case.
On review, however, the Supreme Court found this second filing to be un-
necessary since the EEOC already possessed sufficient information to conduct
43 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), where the Court states: "[C]ourts properly
may accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared
shall have the force of law." Id. at 141.
The Court in General Electric cites Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) as giving a proper view
as to interpretation of administrative regulations. Although the Skidmore case interpreted the Fair Labor and
Standards Act, the case is analogous. The Court in Skidnore stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act,
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of ex-
perience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
The weight of such ajudgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of the reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to contol.
I'd. at 140.
44 See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) in which the court stated:
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides us with a clear mandate from Congress that no
longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the
courts to make sure that the Act works, and the intent.of Congress is not hampered by a combina-
tion of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics.
Id. at 891.
See also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975); Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
45 404 U.S. 522 (1972); See Note, A Look at Love v. Pullman, 37 U. CHi. L. Ray. 181 (1969).
46 Love v. Pullman Co., 430 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 1970).
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an investigation. 47 According to the Courtes interpretation the charge was
automatically filed upon termination of the state proceedings.
Title VII is silent as to the procedure to be followed when a complaint is
initially reported to the EEOC rather than the appropriate state agency. The
procedure developed by the EEOC provided for referral of the claim to the ap-
propriate state agency upon receipt, and automatic filing with the EEOC at the
expiration of 60 days or upon termination of the state proceedings.48 It was this
procedure that produced the basic issue in Love. The Supreme Court found that
the automatic filing procedure used by the Commission upon termination of
state proceedings "complied with the intent of the Act."
49
The decision in Love was a step toward a more liberal approach in the in-
terpretation of Title VII filing requirements. The violation in Love, however,
was of a continuing nature bringing it within an exception to the 300-day
limit.50 Thus, the "automatic filing" procedure used in Love fell unques-
tionably within the limitations of section 706(e), unlike the procedure followed
in Silver. Since it was determined by the district court that Silver did not involve
a continuing violation, the 300-day limit was therefore applicable.
B. Beyond Love
The "automatic filing" concept of Love, when applied to Silver, would
place the official filing date at 352 days after the alleged discriminatory act.
Therefore, the Silver court had to extend the Love decision to allow filing for
purposes of section 706(e) to take place at the point of initial action with the
EEOC. Strict application of the Love principle to the facts in Silver would yield a
result contrary to that reached by the Second Circuit, because the Silver court
held that the charge was filed upon receipt, before the deferral period, rather
than after the deferral period as in Love. The liberal spirit of the Love decision,




In Silver, the Second Circuit found the "clear import of Love" to be that
the charge was filed when initially received by the EEOC.5 2 Although such an
interpretation is an overstatement of the Love decision, it provides an insight in-
47 404 U.S. at 526.
48 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)(1)(iii) (1977).
49 404 U.S. at 525.
A footnote in the Love decision is worthy of explanation. The relevant portion of this note provides:
"[T~he statutory prohibition of § 706(b) [now (c)] against filing charges that have not been referred to a state
or local authority necessarily creates an exception to the regulation requiring filing on receipt." Id. at 526
n.5.
This note was the Court's response to an EEOC regulation under the heading "Contents and Amend-
ments [of the charge]," that allowed filing to occur on the date the initial complaint was received in order
that any later amendments made might relate back to that date. This portion of the regulation was not
primarily applicable in Love, as another portion of the regulation dealt specifically with filing dates in defer-
ral states. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1977) (Contents and Amendments); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1977) (Defer-
rals to State and Local Authorities).
50 See note 25 supra, regarding the "continuing violation" exception.
51 The tone of the Love decision is typified by the following quote: "Such technicalities are particularly
inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process."
404 U.S. at 527.
See comments on the Love decision in Silver, 602 F.2d at 1087.
52 602 F.2d at 1088.
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to the background of the liberal interpretation used by the court in its analysis
of Silver.
C. Interpretation Among the Circuits
Four circuits have faced the question raised in Silver concerning the mean-
ing of the word "filed" as used in section 706(c) and section 706(e). Two cir-
cuits have favored a liberal interpretation, allowing the claimant the maximum
possible benefits of the section 706(e) filing limitations.5 3 One circuit has
favored a literal approach,5 4 narrowing the time allowed for filing a claim, and
another has appeared unsure as to which approach is appropriate.
55
The Tenth Circuit, in Vigil v. AT&T, 56 held that a complainant who cor-
rectly filed with the state agency could file a valid charge with the EEOC within
the state deferral period. This holding is in conflict with a literal reading of sec-
tion 706(c), which would prohibit filing with the EEOC during this 60-day
period. Upon expiration of the state deferral period, the EEOC began process-
ing the claim. Thus, the EEOC in considering the claim to have been "filed"
during the 60-day period, yet not taking any action until the deferral period ex-
pired, honored the strong federal policy underlying the deferral concept.
5 7
In Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, 58 the Sixth Circuit relied heavi-
ly on the equitable concept of tolling, used in the alternative in Vigil, to prevent
the expiration of the statutory filing period. The court found that the initial
EEOC filing tolled the section 706(e) time limitations during the period of the
deferral to the state agency. Therefore, the charge was formally filed with the
EEOC only after the 60-day deferral period had elapsed as is literally required
by section 706(e). Use of the tolling concept avoids the difficulty in defining the
word "filed," yet permits a claim such as Silver's to be considered timely even
though more than 300 days have passed since the occurrence of the alleged
discriminatory act.
5 9
Another case that relied heavily on the tolling concept was Richard v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.60 The Eighth Circuit found that the filing of an initial
claim with the EEOC within the statutory period of section 706(e) tolled the
then applicable 210-day time limitation. This tolling allowed for deferral to the
state agency, but also preserved the federal remedy in the event that state ac-
tion proved unsatisfactory.
The same court that decided Richard subsequently revised its liberal inter-
pretation of the filing requirements of Title VII and adopted a very restrictive
53 Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972); Vigil v. AT&T, 455
F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972).
54 Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
55 Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975) (restrictive); Richard v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1972) (liberal).
56 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972).
57 It is noteworthy that as an alternative basis for its decision, the Tenth Circuit endorsed a tolling con-
cept as applicable to the 5 706(e) filing limitation.
See text accompanying notes 66-76 infra.
58 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
59 Id. at 725.
60 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1972).
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interpretation. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co. 61 was decided on the premise that
the complainant must file with either the state or federal agency within 180
days after the discriminatory act. This decision was based on a fairness con-
sideration that residents of deferral states should not have a time advantage
over residents of nondeferral states in the requirement for initial action upon an
employment discrimination claim.
62
The opinion of the Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 63 written by
Justice Stevens prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, presents a
thorough discussion of the issue faced in Silver. The complainant in Moore
argued that his claim was filed for purposes of section 706(e) on the date of its
initial receipt by the EEOC. The court found that neither the Love decision nor
the legislative history allowed this practice to satisfy the statutory re-
quirements. The Seventh Circuit thus prohibited filing with the EEOC for sec-
tion 706(e) purposes during the state deferral period.
The Silver decision points out, however, that the Moore court refused to
consider the section-by-section analysis accompanying the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 because the amendments were not yet in effect. 64 This
analysis specifically endorsed the Vigil decision allowing filing for purposes of
section 706(e) to occur upon initial receipt of the claim.
65
VIII. The Tolling Concept
If the statutory time limitation of section 706(e) is viewed as a statute of
limitation, many courts have reasoned that the equitable concept of tolling may
be applied. 66 Other courts have found that the time limitations of section 706(e)
are jurisdictional prerequisites to a suit under Title VII, and therefore are not
subject to tolling.
67
Application of the tolling concept would require that the reason for a late
filing be explored in each individual case. While much judicial time v ould be
required to undertake this case-by-case analysis, many courts have rt asoned
that the objectives served by Title VII warrant the additional effort. 68
61 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
62 Id. at 1232.
63 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
64 602 F.2d at 1089 n.17.
65 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
66 See, e.g., Hart v.JJ. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d829 (3dCir. 1979); Reebv. Economic Opportunity
Atlanta Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975); Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390
(E.D. Cal. 1968).
67 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Although the Supreme Court found in
this case that a "jurisdictional prerequisite" to suit was a timely filing of a charge with the Commission, it is
not clear that the Court intended to foreclose the possibility of equitable considerations extending the filing
period. See note 73 infra aid accompanying text.
See also Smith v. Office of Economic Opportunity for Ark., 538 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1976); Greene v.
Carter Carburetor Co., 532 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1976); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th
Cir. 1968).
68 See note 66 supra.
The most convincing example of a situation in which tolling would be appropriate is one in which the
employer takes affirmative steps to deceive an employee as to the true reason for his discharge. If an
employee were simply told that his position had been eliminated, he would have no reason to suspect that a
possible illegal discriminatory act had occurred until he was informed of the hiring of a replacement. In this
case considerations of equity and fairness dictate that the time limitation should begin to run when the
discharged employee learns that his position was in fact subsequently filled rather than eliminated. Reeb v.
Economic Opportunity Atlanta Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Of the three major cases relied upon in Silver as supportive of its holding,
two relied exclusively on the tolling concept, 69 and the other advanced the
theory as an alternative basis for its decision.
70
Although the Second Circuit did not reach the tolling question in Silver, 7 a
discussion of the concept would have heen appropriate, since the cases the
court relied upon for support potentially extend the time limitations of section
706(e) indefinitely when equitable considerations so dictate.
The application of the tolling concept to section 706(e) was considered by
the Supreme Court in Electrical Workers v. Robbins and Meyers, Inc.72 In that case,
the Court found that resort to contractual grievance procedures did not provide
sufficient reason for tolling the statutorily prescribed limitation period, as Title
VII was an entirely independent remedy from that procedure. While some
courts have found this case to stand for the proposition that tolling is never ap-
propriate, language of the Court's opinion is ambiguous as to whether the toll-
ing concept can be applied to other situations. 73 Arguably, the Court's holding
that the precise facts of that case did not provide sufficient reason for tolling
could be interpreted as an implicit recognition that tolling may be appropriate
in other circumstances.
Recently, the Supreme Court in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans74 had the op-
portunity to consider the tolling concept as applied to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967. 7 5 In Oscar Mayer, the Court avoided use
of the word "tolling," but stated that the federal suit may be "held in
abeyance" while the state deferral takes place.
7 6
Soon after his discharge, the complainant in Oscar Mayer inquired of the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Agency as to the requirement that
he file a charge with the appropriate state agency. He was advised that he need
not file with the state agency in order to preserve his federal remedy. This er-
roneous advice caused the complainant to forego state procedures.
69 Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp. Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972); Richard v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1972).
70 Vigil v. AT&T, 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972).
71 602 F.2d at 1089 n.15.
72 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
73 Id. at 240. The Court stated:
Congress did provide in 5 706(b) [now (c)] one exception for this 90 [now 180] day limitation
period when it provided that the limitation period should run for a maximum additional 120 days
when there existed "a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged
and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice
or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof." Where
Congress has spoken with respect to a claim much more closely related to the Title VII claim than
is the contractual claim pursued under the grievance procedure, and thenfirmly limited the max-
imum possible extension of the limitations period applicable thereto, we think that all of the peti-
tioners' arguments taken together simply do not carry sufficient weight to overcome the negative
implication from the negative language used by Congress.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the same opinion, however, the Court gave an indication that extension of the filing period might be ap-
propriate in some cases. The Court stated:
In no way is this a situation in which a party has "been prevented from asserting his or her
rights" [citations omitted]. There is no assertion that [the complainant] was prevented from fil-
ing a charge with the EEOC within 90 days....
Id. at 237 n.10.
74 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
75 29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(1976). The filing requirements of this Act are substantially similar to those in Ti-
tle VII.
76 441 U.S. at 764.
[Vol. 55:396]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The district court and circuit court in Oscar Mayer found that the maximum
300-day time limitation would bar the suit. The Supreme Court found that
although the agency misled the complainant as to the necessity of pursuing his
state remedy, he still was required to commence proceedings with the state
agency. This was true even though the state statute of limitation had run.
The interesting aspect of the decision, however, is the Court's order to the
district court to "hold the charge in abeyance" until the state charge was filed
and summarily rejected. In this case a valid filing with the federal agency did
not occur until at least three years after the discriminatory act, far beyond the
300-day limitation of the ADEA procedural statute. Thus, equitable considera-
tions permit tolling of the filing limitations under the ADEA, and analogously
under Title VII.
Although the court in Silver had no need to consider the tolling concept
once it had decided that sections 706(c) and (e) did not conflict, equities in
future cases may require extension of the filing limitations beyond those stated
in Title VII.
IX. Conclusion
In Silver v. Mohasco Corp. the Second Circuit extended the interpretation of
Title VII filing requirements to comply with the stated policies and purposes
behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The remedial theory of Title VII was the
primary consideration in the Silver decision, which held that a claim is "filed"
for purposes of section 706(e) upon receipt by the EEOC, before deferral to the
appropriate state agency. This decision allows initial action by a complainant
in a deferral state to be taken at any time within the 300 days provided in sec-
tion 706(e).
The liberal interpretation of Title VII filing requirements by the Second
Circuit in Silver thus was the logical extension of a judicial trend recognizing
that those unskilled in the law should be given the benefit of the doubt in the in-
terpretation of Title VII procedural requirements. 7 7 The holding in the present
case fulfills the policy behind Title VII by providing the widest possible scope
of remedies for victims of employment discrimination.
A case of employment discrimination may require a party to refer to the
United States Code for the first and only time in his life. An intelligent, but
isolated reading of section 706(e) could easily lead one to believe that 300 days
is the time limitation for filing an initial claim with the EEOC. A complainant
should not be penalized for Congressional ambiguity, or because he does not
possess the reading ability of one trained in statutory interpretation. This in-
deed is the level of skill required to find the "hidden" 240-day limitation ad-
vocated by the district court in Silver.
78
77 See notes 44 and 51 supra.
78 Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 19 FEP Cases 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
Mr. Silver had completed two years of law school and possessed a certain degree of skill in statutory in-
terpretation; however, in considering a case of this sort the courts must consider the fact that the vast ma-
jority of potential plaintiffs will not have the benefit of such training.
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COMMENTS
A petition for certiorari in the Silver case has been granted by the Supreme
Court. 79 The Court should now affirm the Silver holding and clarify the
statutory language of Title VII so that parties throughout the country have a
definitive interpretation of the statutory filing periods.
Douglas A. Schaaf
79 48 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1979)(No. 79-616).
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